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Praying Together:  
Corporate Prayer and Shared Situations 
 
Introduction 
On the 26 May 1940, Britain was at a point of crisis. Locked in war with Nazi Germany, British 
troops were stranded on the beach at Dunkirk. King George VI called for the nation to turn to 
God in prayer and plead for his assistance. Millions of individuals flocked to churches and 
queued for hours outside Westminster Abbey to pray together for God’s assistance. Whilst 
undoubtedly many of these individuals were already active in praying regularly for God’s 
protection of their country and troops, there was something importantly different about the 
mass-scaled coordination of prayer that happened on this day. What followed was the so-called 
‘miracle of Dunkirk’—a violent storm over the beaches of Dunkirk grounded many of the 
Luftwaffe, followed by a period of calm in which British civilians united to rescue the troops 
using fishing boats and small leisure boats. Many saw these events as a direct answer to prayer 
and a work of God. Whilst these circumstances were extraordinary, the practice of praying 
together in this way is something that happens on a regular basis across churches all over the 
country, and indeed, the world, today. Praying together takes many different forms—from small 
prayer groups in houses, to intercessory prayer in formal church liturgies, to mass-scale prayer 
gatherings. And whilst we are not aiming to defend the claim that the events at Dunkirk were 
miraculous or a direct answer to prayer here, we aim to offer one general account of the 
psychological benefits of corporate prayer which might offer one potential explanation of some 
of the events that unfolded. 
The practice of prayer has been the subject of countless academic books and journal 
articles in psychology, theology, and philosophy of religion.1 Yet, despite recent work in 
sociology,2 anthropology,3 and ethnography4 on the social dimensions of prayer, much of the 
theological and philosophical literature focuses only on acts of private communication between 
individuals and God. In this article we develop a theologically and psychologically informed 
account of the nature and value of corporate prayer.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In the first section, we begin by outlining a theological 
claim that is made by Vincent Brümmer (1984) and H. H. Farmer (1942), namely, that corporate 
prayer has potential to be more effective than individual prayer since corporate prayer allows us 
to engage not only with God, but also with one another. There are many layers to this 
theological claim—corporate prayer involves participating in a mystical body, united by the 
actions of the Holy Spirit (Underhill, 1936, 81), as well as participating in various visible 
manifestations of this metaphysical reality—whether that be in a church congregation, or in a 
national day of prayer. In this paper, whilst we do not have scope to explore all facets of the 
nature and value of corporate prayer, we focus our attention on one such area, namely, the 
social-psychological dimension of corporate prayer. By drawing on this social-psychological 
literature, we aim to explore the theological claim that praying together might be more effective 
than praying alone, and how to appropriately understand the idea of “efficiency” in this context. 
In the second section we focus on giving an account of what it is to pray together by 
proposing that shared experiences exist on a scale of ‘sharedness’. We begin by considering cases 
in which participants are physically co-present with one another, which seem most easy to 
capture as instances of corporate prayer. By drawing on the psychological literature on joint 
attention (e.g. Moore and Dunham, 1995; Scaife and Bruner, 1975), the second-personal 
perspective (Reddy, 1996; Gómez, 1996), and the philosophical notion of shared situations 
(Barwise, 1989), we explain what it is for a case of physically co-present prayer to be corporate. 
We then consider cases that appear less easy to categorise as shared due to their not involving 
physically co-present participants. Cases such as praying at the same time as a religious 
community (as in the case of the national day of prayer cited above), praying in a sacred space in 
which people have prayed for hundreds of years, and praying alongside the communion of 
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saints, all appear to share some features with instances of corporate prayer in which there is 
physical co-presence, but yet, in other respects, there are important differences. By reflecting on 
these different kinds of praying together, we propose that all share in common a ‘sense of 
sharedness’ which can be established through a variety of means (Shteynberg, 2015).5 We 
propose a scale of sharedness, which takes as its strongest examples cases of physically co-
present corporate prayer, but which can include cases that are shared in a weaker sense. It is 
important to flag at this point, that this scale of sharedness refers only to a certain psychological 
and epistemological account of what it is for a situation to be shared. There are, no doubt, 
important ways in which our prayer is part of a larger body, even if we do not realise that this is 
the case. The metaphysics of corporate prayer is another important discussion, but one which we 
must bracket for another occasion.  
In the third and final section, we turn to consider the values of corporate prayer 
understood as a shared situation. We argue that this kind of shared prayer enables common 
knowledge of certain truths between participants. As we will explain, shared situations involve 
multiple levels of alignment, from, what William McNeill (1997) terms ‘muscular’ coordination 
of bodies (1997) to alignment of mental states (Gallotti, Fairhurst and Frith, 2017; Tollefson and 
Dale, 2012). As we will highlight, there have been a number of studies in social psychology that 
have affirmed and developed these notions of alignment through processes such as imitation and 
synchronisation, things that we claim can help us to understand the corporate dimension of 
prayer. Through these aligning processes, participants’ attention is focussed to the same target 
and affiliation between participants increases. Thus, we suggest, one benefit (indeed, there are 
surely many more benefits which we do not have space to explore here) of understanding 
corporate prayer as a shared situation is that it establishes and deepens a sense of community in 
such a way that common purposes and goals might be enacted more effectively. 
Before proceeding, we offer some brief words on the nature of the project we are 
advancing. There are many approaches one might take in drawing together insights from 
psychology and theology, and indeed there are already many discussions of psychology and 
prayer.6 There is also a growing body of literature addressing corporate prayer, particularly in the 
psychological literature. For instance, in Spilka and Ladd’s (2012) comprehensive study of the 
psychology of prayer, there is some discussion of corporate prayer. Their approach is much 
more all-encompassing than the approach we pursue here. Rather than focusing on prayer in 
general, we give attention to a very specific aspect of corporate prayer.7 In this article, we follow 
the approach advocated by Malcolm Jeeves and Thomas Ludwig (2018) by seeking to engage in a 
constructive dialogue between psychology and theology, with each field offering 
complementary insights and enrichments into religious issues. Thus, our psychologically 
informed account of why certain forms of corporate prayer might be effective is seeking neither 
to replace theological reflection on this issue nor to provide neat or convenient concordism 
between the findings of psychology research and Christian teachings. Rather, we suggest, 
focusing on certain psychological features of corporate prayer can provide fresh insight and 
enrichment to the question of why corporate prayer is valuable.  
 
1. The Theology of Praying Together 
Corporate prayer is one of the central practices of the Church. From the early Church (Acts 1:14; 
4:23-32), to the present day, almost every Christian tradition and denomination practices some 
form of praying together. Moreover, in certain traditions of Judaism, community prayer is 
prioritised over individual prayer; the practice of minyan prayer is an important part of Jewish 
ritual life but requires at least ten adults to practice. Thus, whilst Christianity is not the only 
tradition that focuses on corporate prayer, for sake of familiarity and brevity, we focus on 
Christian examples of prayer here. The Christian tradition clearly affirms both private and 
corporate acts of prayer. In the Gospel according to Matthew, for instance, Jesus instructs his 
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hearers that, ‘whenever you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to your Father 
who is in secret’ (Matthew 6:6). We can also clearly see Jesus’s own practice of praying alone in 
many places, such as in the garden of Gethsemane (Matthew 26), for example. But yet, many of 
the Epistles encourage the practice of praying corporately; Paul tells Timothy that he wants ‘the 
men everywhere to pray, lifting up holy hands without anger or disputing’ (1 Timothy 2:8). The 
early Church were also clearly committed to corporate prayer as part of their regular practice; 
Luke tells us that, ‘they devoted themselves to the apostles’ teaching and the fellowship, to the 
breaking of bread and the prayers’ (Acts 2:42). It is important to note that whilst we attempt to 
speak of the value of corporate prayer, we do not claim that corporate prayer is more valuable 
than private prayer, but rather, that corporate prayer and private prayer are importantly different in 
the values they offer.   
Let us begin by considering the general question of what value corporate prayer might 
have by considering the following description of prayer in the Quaker community: 
 
[a] In the quiet we look for a sense of connection. This might be a connection with those 
around us, with our deepest selves, or perhaps with God. As we feel this sense of 
encounter grow stronger, we may begin to see the world and our relationships in a new 
way. Our worship may take us beyond our own thoughts and ideas to help us respond 
more creatively to the world around us…Anyone can contribute to a Quaker meeting for 
worship – there is no leader. We do have people with a responsibility to encourage and 
nurture ministry, but we don't believe that makes them more important. We call these 
people 'elders'…You can sit anywhere you want. No seats are special or reserved. Chairs 
or benches are usually arranged in a circle or a square. This helps us connect with each 
another and reminds us that we are worshipping as equals. The meeting starts as soon as 
the first person enters the room. (Quakers In Britain, n.d.)8  
 
Here, prayer is described not only as having value in communicating with God, but also as 
having value for strengthening our relationships with other people. This value does not seem to 
be unique to the Quaker tradition either. Whilst the details of specific practices in various 
Christian traditions might be different, a generalised point can be drawn: one of the differences 
between corporate and private prayer is that corporate prayer allows us to engage with other 
people, as well as with God.  
This difference in the nature of corporate prayer might also point us to some of its 
potential benefits—in the example above, the writer speaks of the sense of connection which is 
available from engaging in group prayer, which is surely lacking from private prayer. Another 
answer which has been given to the question of the value of corporate prayer is that in certain 
respects, corporate prayer has the potential to be more effective than private prayer. Note, this is 
not to say that corporate prayer is more valuable than private prayer; indeed, there are surely 
values to private prayer which are entirely lacking from corporate prayer (e.g. the opportunity for 
intimate I-thou communication with God might be less available in some corporate contexts).  
Let us consider this claim that corporate prayer has the potential to be more effective 
because of its communal dimension in more detail.   
First, the 20th century Presbyterian minister and theologian H. H. Farmer claims that 
corporate prayer has the potential to be effective in ways that individual prayer often cannot in 
his discussion of divine personhood in The World and God. Farmer entered academic theology 
after a long period of time in ministry, and this is reflected in his writings in the emphasis on the 
practical outworkings of various theological positions. The Word and God is not primarily a book 
addressing issues of prayer, but rather, a theological exploration of what it means to describe 
God as personal, and an application of this theology to issues of practice, such as prayer. The 
primary discussion of prayer in the text focuses not on corporate prayer, but rather, on prayer as 
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a means of responding to the person of God. Many of the examples given by Farmer are taken 
from instances of private prayer.   
 Later in the text, in a chapter on divine providence, Farmer considers the relationship 
between God’s providence and the practice of prayer. He writes that, ‘reconciled man…becomes 
a co-operator with God, so that through him God gets a purchase on the human scene not 
otherwise possible. The new life of co-operation with God is manifested in prayer, and in a daily 
activity increasingly informed and guided by the divine Spirit’ (1942, 261). As with the earlier 
discussion of prayer in the text, here Farmer affirms that prayer predominantly involves the 
individual’s ‘awareness’ of ‘having being sought and found and reconciled by…[the] love of God’ 
(1942, 262). Yet, within this discussion, Farmer stresses that there are implications for thinking 
of prayer as a co-operation with the will of God. For instance, he notes, thinking of prayer as co-
operative means that mere repetition of some set of words is not sufficient for prayer to be 
effective, we must also enter into the situation of those we pray for in ‘a deliberate act to enter 
into’ the needs of others (1942, 263). In this context, Farmer also stresses that one implication of 
thinking of prayer as a co-operation with the will of God is that we can see a particular value in 
praying corporately. He writes that, seeing prayer as a co-operative venture with God  
 
indicates the value of corporate prayer, on which the Christian consciousness has always 
insisted. If there is an added effectiveness in prayers which, without ceasing to be the 
expression of the individual’s own heart, are also corporate, it is because such prayers are 
prayers of fellowship, prayers of the Church. They rest on, and carry the power of, at 
least a partial realisation of that to which all true prayer is directed, namely that 
membership one of another in the love of God, which is the kingdom. To regard 
corporate prayer as though it were an addition sum, so that the more people there are 
praying for anything the more certain is the result, merely because there are, so to say, 
more units of prayer-pressure per square-inch being exercised, is, of course, shallow and 
absurd. More people at prayer means more effectiveness in prayer only if it represents an 
extension and a deepening of fellowship, a passing of more personalities out of the lower 
and sinful status of isolation into the higher and redeemed status of loving co-operation 
in God for the high ends of His kingdom. (264-265) 
 
Thus, Farmer claims, if we think of prayer as a means of co-operating with God’s will, then one 
implication is that we should recognise corporate prayer as having a certain kind of efficiency. 
Again, this claim need not diminish the value of private prayer (this would be strange considering 
Farmer spends much longer discussing the value of prayer in non-corporate contexts), but 
rather, it stresses the difference between the two kinds of prayer and the potential value which 
might arise because of their difference in nature.  
 Secondly, the South African philosopher and theologian Vincent Brümmer, in his 
influential work on the philosophy of prayer, claims that, ‘corporate prayer is more effective than 
individual prayer, not because it brings more pressure to bear on God but because it enlists more 
people in the realization of God’s will’ (1984, 58). Let us quickly contextualise this discussion. 
Brümmer is directly building on Farmer’s remarks here, but the context of his discussions is much 
narrower than Farmer’s. Brümmer is primarily concerned with the philosophical question 
(sometimes dubbed ‘the problem of petitionary prayer’) of why a perfectly good God would listen 
and respond to the petitions of finite imperfect creatures. These remarks on the efficacy of 
corporate petitionary prayer conclude his discussion of petitionary intercessory prayer. As he 
describes his position, intercessory prayer ‘is a prayer in which the person who prays both asks 
God to act on behalf of the person or cause for whom he intercedes, and also makes himself 
available as a secondary cause through whom God could act in answering prayer’ (1984, 57). In 
other words, on Brümmer’s view, one of the reasons that God asks us to petition him in 
interceding for others is so that we might co-operate with God’s will more fully. One implication 
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of this view Brümmer claims, is that corporate prayer is more effective, since it allows more people 
to be enlisted into the realization of God’s will.  
 Thus, as we see in both Farmer’s and Brümmer’s works, the claim that corporate prayer 
is more effective in certain contexts is the implication of a certain co-operative view of 
petitionary prayer. We are not concerned here with defending this view of petitionary or 
intercessory prayer, but rather, in this paper, we aim to explore why it might be that corporate 
prayer sometimes has potential to be more effective in the ways Farmer and Brümmer envision. 
If their views of intercessory prayer turn out to be wrong, we hope to still have shown that there 
is some truth in their claim that corporate prayer has potential to be more effective. Before 
exploring this claim in more detail, however, some clarifications are in order. To many people, 
the claim the corporate prayer has potential to be more efficient than private prayer will seem 
contentious, if not obviously false. For as we have already acknowledged, there are many 
instances in Scripture in which private prayer is both modelled and exhorted. We need to be 
careful to examine just what this claim concerning corporate prayer’s efficiency amounts to, then.  
First, the claim that corporate prayer has potential to be more effective is not equivalent 
to saying that corporate prayer is more valuable. For this would assume that the only aim of 
prayer is efficiency of ends—indeed, it seems obvious (to the authors at least) that private prayer 
serves much better as a means of developing personal closeness in relationship with God. 
Another way of putting this same point is to note that different forms or contexts of prayer are 
equally effective but for different kinds of outcomes (such as differential effects on mental or 
spiritual health), this is a point explored in research by Baesler and Ladd (2009).9 Moreover, as is 
evident in both Brümmer’s and Farmer’s works, claims about a specific value of corporate prayer 
do not amount to a pitting of corporate prayer against private prayer. Indeed, both Brümmer and 
Farmer spend considerably more time exploring private prayer than corporate prayer in the 
works which these above claims are made. Thus, it is important to note that a claim about 
differences in value does not amount to any kind of claim concerning the preference or hierarchy 
of such value.  
Secondly, the claim is not that corporate prayer is always more efficient. As an 
anonymous referee helpfully points out to us, this stronger claim is clearly false for it would 
imply that Jesus’s praying in Gethsemane would have been improved by waking up the disciples 
(Matthew 6:6-14). It is important to see that there are many cases in which corporate prayer is 
less effective than private prayer—if one is praying in a context which distracts one from God, 
or which distorts the message of Scripture, then praying with others might have negative 
consequences, rather than positive. The claim made by Brümmer and Farmer (at least as we 
interpret it) is that corporate prayer has the potential to be more effective than private prayer 
because it allows us to influence one another (as well as God). As Farmer puts it, corporate 
prayer is more effective, ‘only if it represents an extension out of the lower and sinful status of 
isolation into the higher and redeemed status of loving co-operation in God for the high ends of 
his kingdom’ (1939, 265; emphasis added). In other words, since corporate prayer allows us to 
influence one another in certain respects (and it is these certain respects we attempt to flesh out 
in this paper), it allows us to influence one another positively only if this influence is directed 
toward the ends of God’s will and God’s kingdom.   
 With these clarifications in place, we can see that the claim concerning efficiency is not a 
claim about corporate prayer being better or more important than private prayer, nor is it a claim 
which applies to all instances of corporate prayer. But rather, the claim is the relatively weak 
claim that since corporate prayer allows us to influence one another, it has the potential to be 
more effective in actualising certain ends. The question we aim to explore is just what the nature 
of this influence is and just why it might allow some kinds of prayer to be more effective. As 
Bernard Spilka and Kevin Ladd (2012) note in their comprehensive overview of the psychology 
of prayer, in praying in a group situation, ‘the prayer is typically conceived as an occasion when 
one is connected not only with a singular object (i.e., one’s Deity) but also is simultaneously in 
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the presence of other believers’ (2012, 44). As they go on to describe, this sense of connection 
with other believers, can create social bonds, as well as influencing and enhancing individuals’ 
own experiences of prayer’ (2012, 44). It is this sense of connection as a means of influence that 
we explore in more detail in the remainder of this paper. Whilst some of our discussion overlaps 
with Spilka and Ladd’s, we develop this discussion in a much more specific way, as their study 
attempts to give a comprehensive overview of the psychology of prayer and not just corporate 
prayer.   
To do this, we begin by considering what it is for prayer to be shared by drawing on the 
psychological literature on joint attention and common knowledge. We then suggest that this 
analysis of praying together can help us to give an account of prayer’s value and effectiveness. 
Thus, the value of corporate prayers appears to be found in its ability to influence pray-ers to 
think and act differently, and ideally, to influence one another to bring about Godly ends. In 
what follows, we offer an account of corporate prayer that seeks to address why praying together 
has this value. Note, as will become clear later in the paper, it is sometimes hard to distinguish 
between private and corporate prayer, especially if we emphasise the importance of prayer as 
contributing to the larger metaphysical unity of the whole Church. On the picture we go on to 
develop, one of the key differences between these two kinds of prayer is phenomenological.  
 
2.1 Physical Co-Presence, Praying Together and Sharing Attention 
What does it mean to pray together? First, as we have highlighted above, whilst most traditions 
use some kind of corporate prayer, this does not always take the same format. Thus, it will be 
helpful to consider some examples of how corporate prayer is practiced by means of three 
examples. We deliberately begin by considering cases in which prayer involves physical co-
presence between participants, and later turn to consider cases in which there is little or no 
physical co-presence. The first is a description of corporate prayer at a Vineyard congregation in 
the USA, the second is taken from a Franciscan order in the United Kingdom, and the third is an 
account of a kind of prayer practiced in some Korean churches:  
 
[b] People pray for each other in many different ways. In ‘prayer ministry,’ the person for 
whom one is praying is physically present. One stands before the person and puts one’s 
hand on their arm or shoulder, or—if praying in a large group—on the arm or shoulder 
of someone who is touching them, or at least with one one’s hands out facing them. 
(Luhrmann, 2012, 49) 
 
[c] The chapel was laid out with pews facing each other. The brothers would meet to 
pray three times a day. Facing one another, they would recite lines of the liturgy together, 
each side of the room taking it in turns to recite each line of a psalm or prayer. Almost 
instinctively, all of the participants (other than me) knew where to pause and when to 
switch sides. (Author’s own account) 
 
[d] ‘A unique and special Korean prayer style is called Tongsung Kido. Tongsung means, 
‘cry out together loudly,’ and Kido means, ‘pray.’… during worship, usually at the time of 
special prayer request, the minister or the worship leader will call the congregation to 
pray in unison. The whole congregation joins together to pray aloud, individually at the 
same time. Sometimes, in the beginning of prayer, the congregation may shout, ‘Lord! 
Lord! Lord!’ in unison, as a cooperative sign of engaging in prayer. Usually the 
congregation is given a specific amount of time to pray, with a common theme of 




What is it about these experiences that make them all instances of corporate prayer? A simple, 
intuitive response might be that these varied examples (along with many other examples of 
corporate prayer) are cases in which the situation of praying is in some way shared. That is, 
individuals come together to pray in the same space and at the same time. However, whilst this 
response might appear intuitive, there are some obvious counter-examples. For instance, it seems 
entirely possible to be praying in the same space and at the same time as another person, yet not 
be engaged in corporate prayer. It might be, for instance, that John and Mary just happen to be 
in the same church building, praying at the same time, but neither of them realises the other is 
also present. In such a case, despite John and Mary praying in the same space at the same time, it 
would seem strange to describe this as an instance of corporate prayer. What is lacking from this 
situation, we think, is the sense of sharedness that accompanies the examples of prayer in 
examples [a]-[d].  
 The sense of sharedness that underlies corporate prayer is something that is by no means 
unique to religious rituals and practices; humans are an immensely social species, and our 
experience of the world involves many varied shared experiences. We watch football matches 
together, we go to parties together, we sit on public transport together. Moreover, sharing these 
experiences plays an important role in how we relate to one another— our relationships depend 
on, and are deepened by, the extent of our shared experience with one another. Corporate 
religious practices are one such instance of shared experience. They can therefore be understood, 
to some extent, by considering the cognitive mechanisms that underpin such shared experiences. 
  An influential hypothesis advanced by Michael Tomasello and his colleagues is that this 
capacity for shared experience stems from what he and others have termed shared intentionality 
(Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll, 2005). Shared intentionality refers to the ability and 
motivation to engage in cooperative activities that involve the sharing of intentions and goals (as 
well as other psychological states such as shared emotions and shared beliefs)—to act as a ‘We’. 
Typically, examples that are given of shared intentionality refer to two or more individuals 
coordinating in some task such as performing a dance routine (Searle, 1992) or playing a musical 
duet together (Searle, 2010). These cases all involve individuals acting not merely as individuals, 
but also intending that their actions form part of a wider ‘We’. Whilst how we should analyse the 
nature of these we-intentions is hotly contested,10 there is widespread agreement in the 
philosophical literature that there is some difference between individual and collectively intended 
action.  
It has been observed that our first shared experiences of the world and the earliest 
expression of shared intentionality are found in the primordial sharing situation of joint attention. 
We here follow others (Tomasello, 2014; Zahavi and Satne, 2015) in claiming that shared 
intentionality takes different forms, from dyadic engagements with a particular other to ‘forms 
that go beyond the here and now and involve the construction of a common cultural ground 
(involving conventions, norms and institutions)’ (Zahavi and Satne, 2015, 2). Under a broad 
definition, joint attention describes a situation in which two or more individuals attend to 
something together. This ‘something’ can be a variety of types of target: a physical object, event 
or abstract symbol. A textbook example would be the situation in which an infant playing with a 
toy looks up to his mother, smiles, and holds the toy up to her, thereby ‘triangulating’ their 
attention onto the toy. Although gaze is the typical modality that is considered in investigations 
of joint attention, it can be coordinated through other modalities such as touch and speech.11  
Thus, at least part of what it is for an experience to be shared is that the individuals 
involved are engaged in jointly attending to some object or event. Whilst perspectives differ on 
how to understand this sharedness (see, for example, Tomasello, 1995 versus Hobson, 2005; 
Reddy, 2008), there is a widespread agreement that some stipulation about mutual awareness is 
important for joint attention to be considered truly joint or shared (Carpenter and Liebal, 2011; 
Eilan, ms.; Hobson, 2005; Tomasello, 1995). It is important to note that simply orienting to a 
common focus is not joint attention in a strict sense; there is no mutuality to the experience 
 8 
(Tomasello, 1995). Consider, for example, the situation in which a train station full of passengers 
attend to the screen displaying information about train times. Even though the passengers attend 
to the same target, it seems intuitive to say that this experience is not shared in a strong sense. 
Even in cases where an attender causes another to attend to a common target (e.g., in following 
another’s gaze to a target), there might still be a critical absence of interpersonal connectedness 
that provides the crucial ingredient of sharedness.  
So, to give an account of sharedness, more detail is needed than simply noting the 
importance of simultaneous object attention. To fill this account out in more detail then, 
following a number of researchers,12 we suggest that joint attention should be understood 
through the lens of the ‘second-person perspective’. This line of argument is not to deny the 
importance of third-person modes of social cognition in how we understand others’ minds. 
Rather, it emphasises that shared experiences have their basis in interactive, reciprocal 
engagements. Broadly conceived, the second-person perspective highlights that human social 
understanding is different in important ways when others are engaged directly and interactively 
as a ‘You’ (second-personally) as opposed to viewing them as a ‘He’, ‘She’ or ‘It’ (3rd personally). 
Suppose John and Mary are reading in a library at the same time for some time, and then become 
aware of one another by, say, sharing a knowing look concerning a disturbance from a group of 
noisy students. The knowing look provides an interactive, communicative connection that makes 
the experience of the noisy students shared between John and Mary.13 Prior to the knowing look, 
we would say that the experience of the students was common between John and Mary but is only 
shared once the second-person connection is established.14 Interactive engagements are inherently 
other-involving and reciprocal in a way that is not possible from simply observing another’s 
behaviour.15 John might intently study Mary’s behaviour and carefully consider her perspective, 
but no amount of individual thinking can make an experience truly mutual or shared; Mary must 
be both aware of John’s attention towards her and must indicate her attention to John for true 
mutuality to be present. In other words, there must be a sense of ‘bi-directionality’ (Zahavi, 
2015). In second-person interactions, both participants contribute to the structure of the 
interaction; timing and responsivity become key (Moore and Barresi, 2017). Participants in an 
embodied joint attention interaction (embodied here meaning with a co-present, engaged other) 
align their bodily movements and attentional states.16 
The above considerations concerning joint attention and the second-person perspective 
have potential to explain what makes certain instances of prayer corporate, or shared, we think. 
For in the example above, one of the crucial things that was lacking in John and Mary’s 
experiences was that they were not engaged in joint attention. In a recent article, Joshua 
Cockayne and David Efird (2018) have suggested that corporate liturgy might provide an 
opportunity for participants of a liturgy to engage in joint attention with one another whilst 
mutually attending to the words of the liturgy, and subsequently to God’s presence as a mutual 
object of their perception.17 Building on much of the literature cited above, they claim that jointly 
attending to a liturgical script can allow congregants to shape and direct one another’s experience 
of God. They suggest that an awareness of other worshippers might allow us ‘to redirect our 
own attention and thereby to experience some different aspect of God, thereby removing our 
biases in important ways.’ (2018, 320). Thus, perhaps the same can be said about the sharedness 
of corporate prayer. Just as the liturgical script can provide a mutual object around which the 
congregation can focus and guide one another’s attention, the practice of corporate prayer might 
allow for a kind of mutual-object focusing. In example [b], this seems to be precisely what 
occurs—the words of the intercessor provide an object of attention, which the congregation can 
jointly attend to, thereby shaping their own perception of the environment and, perhaps, their 
experience of God.  
However, whilst an appeal to the psychology of interactive engagement has some 
application, it also has its limits, at least in the case of corporate prayer. Given the critical nature 
of second-person engagement for the jointness of joint attention, potential problems arise when 
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considering typical cases of corporate prayer. In most church services, we see only the backs of 
people’s heads, or the top of our own shoes. In instances of corporate prayer, most of the 
congregation close their eyes and are perhaps only directly aware of the individual they can 
audibly hear. In the case of Tanya Luhrmann’s visit to the Vineyard church, this might be the 
individual whose hand was on her. But in many contexts the only person we might be directly 
aware of is the leader of the intercessory prayers. Cases can also vary in how shared the 
experience is. In cases of ‘Tongsung Kido’, the act is necessarily shared yet also highly 
individualistic, in the sense that the content of each prayer is known only to the individual pray-
er. Whilst this is clearly not the case for all instances of corporate prayer, it might appear that 
appealing to an account of joint attention to explain the sharedness of a situation is problematic, 
at least for some instances of corporate prayer. Moreover, as we will suggest, some cases of 
shared prayer are even more difficult to account for by appealing to embodied, interactive joint 
attention. The case of the National Day of Prayer appears to be one such case in which the sense 
of sharedness extends beyond those who were engaged in interactive joint attention.  
In the next section, we suggest that a broader concept of second-personal engagement 
can help us to provide an account of the sharedness of corporate prayer that does not require 
participants to be interactively sharing attention with each other throughout. We suggest that by 
drawing together recent psychological and philosophical literature that emphasises the 
importance of connecting shared ‘We’ experiences with the experience of intersubjective second-
person engagement and joint attention (Brinck, Zahavi and Reddy, 2017), we can provide a 
broader account of the shared nature of corporate prayer.  
 
2.2 Shared Situations and Groups: Moving Beyond Physical Co-Presence 
So far, we have described the importance of joint attention in understanding shared experience, 
and its necessarily interactive, engaged character. We have also suggested that understanding 
corporate prayer in terms of joint attention provides a helpful starting point for understanding 
the sharedness of corporate prayer. This analysis fits cleanly within small-scale cases of praying 
together, where participants can interactively respond to each other’s prayers. But humans are 
capable of collective intentional acts that go beyond the here-and-now and create richly complex 
cultural activities and institutions.18 In this section, we consider how broader metaphysical claims 
about the nature of praying as part of a larger community can have epistemological implications 
for what gives certain kinds of the prayer the phenomenology of sharedness.   
Focusing only on examples of prayer which involve physical co-presence threatens to 
miss important points raised in the literature about joint attention in large groups,19 as well as 
evidence of the influences of group rituals as providing affiliative benefits,20 and forms of 
common knowledge amongst the participators in those activities.21 Examples such as the 
following force us to think more broadly about the notion of sharedness in corporate prayer:  
 
[e] The Church had been running a 40-day community prayer event over lent, with 
materials for the congregation to take home, giving them short passages with brief 
prayers to use during private devotion. One woman in the community was particularly 
thankful for the event, as she was unable to regularly attend Sunday worship due to 
working away from the area. She described the comfort that came from praying with an 
awareness that others were praying alongside her. (Author’s own experience of 
community prayer at a Baptist Church)  
 
The challenge that cases such as this raise is to broaden our understanding of what it means to 
share attention beyond the kind of attention sharing that occurs in an embodied, second-person 
dyadic interaction. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full account of sharing 
attention as a group, we will provide a general framework for understanding this issue that can 
help explain cases of corporate prayer that extend more broadly than embodied second-person 
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dyadic interaction. Consider the following three cases to see how such an account might be 
developed in more general terms:  
 
1. John drives his taxi with Mary riding in the back 
2. John and Mary have a conversation while standing in a circle of friends at a cocktail party 
3. John and Mary watch the World Cup semi-final together in a large public football match 
screening  
 
Whilst these cases have important differences, we could describe them all, following Jon 
Barwise (1989), as ‘shared situations’. Barwise uses the term situation as a way of referring to 
some corner of the world that an individual can access; a shared situation is some corner of the 
world that two or more individuals share together. Barwise has a technical notion of a situation 
that is part of his formal semantic theory. We do not intend to commit to the whole of Barwise’s 
project, but, rather, to follow the spirit of his approach; in his words: ‘… cognitive activity takes 
crucial advantage both of the agents’ place in the environment and of regularities in their local 
environment. Moreover, the cognitive abilities of the agent have a certain ‘reach’ which 
determines, at any given time, a situation, the largest portion of reality that the agent has access 
to… …this situation may extend quite far in time and space’ (1989, 223). Our use of the phrase 
‘shared situation’ is with the aim of capturing two key points. First, joint attention occurs in 
temporally extended episodes or activities (such as in example [e]), and within these activities 
there is a continual sense of jointness that persists even in the absence of direct second-person 
engagement. This sense of jointness is weaker than that which emerges from engagement, but is 
nonetheless important. Second, we use the language of shared situations to emphasise the 
significance of being embedded in spatial, social and historical settings that shape our cognition, 
and our social cognition in particular.22  
What do we mean by ‘a continual sense of jointness’? Let us return to cases 1-4 to explore 
this concept more carefully. In (1), there may be shared moments of joint attention between 
John and Mary, where they lock on to the same feature of the world (e.g., when Mary points out 
the right street for John to turn into). But even when they do not (e.g., when Mary is on her 
phone and John watches the road), there is the sense that there is still something shared about 
their situation. By participating in the shared activity of the taxi ride, they both inhabit a shared 
situation, with particular spatial and temporal boundaries; spatially they are constrained by the 
taxi and its environs, and the temporal limits are set by the length of the shared activity of the 
taxi ride. They also inhabit a shared culture of norms and information that they can draw upon if 
need be. This sense of sharedness provides contextual framing by which individuals’ actions, 
communicative or otherwise, can be interpreted.  
It is important to note that this embeddedness occurs on multiple scales (Siposova and 
Carpenter, forthcoming). In (2), whilst there is the situation of the conversation between John 
and Mary, the situation also involves a wider sense of sharedness in virtue of the circle of friends, 
which contains the situations involving John and Mary. Each of these layers can be viewed as a 
shared situation; that is, a context in which there is a sense of common participation and 
sharedness and which individuals can attend to as it is relevant to them. In case (3), just as in (2) 
John and Mary’s sharedness extends to those who are also gathered at the public screening, but it 
also seems to extend wider than this—to the other 20 million or so viewers of the televised 
broadcast of the match, alongside those watching in the stadium. National events such as 
football matches, royal weddings, and national prayer rallies foster a sense of sharedness that 
extends much more broadly than those in which one is directly engaged in embodied attention 
sharing.  
A key element of this approach that is important to emphasise is the process of 
alignment. Participation in a shared situation ensures, to some greater or lesser extent, aligning 
with the other participants in that situation. Consequently, the ‘second-personal’ features that 
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make an embodied, interactive case of joint attention shared continue to be relevant in the 
context of a shared situation. Features such as synchrony, contingency and timing continue to be 
relevant in creating shared experience, as they support the process of alignment that occurs in 
shared experiences. This has been shown at the level of bodily or ‘muscular’ coordination 
(McNeill, 1997), which serves to increase participants’ sense of affiliation with each other (we 
return to this point shortly). But it also occurs at the mental level. For example, simultaneously 
saying the same words creates the knowledge that these words are a shared target of attention 
and the subject of our thoughts; therefore, repeating these words establishes these thoughts as 
more certainly shared (Chwe, 2001). Thus we would argue that shared experiences involve 
aligning on multiple scales. 
 The cases above (1-3) have similarities with the examples of corporate prayer: in 
corporate prayer, like in case (1), there is a sense in which a shared situation exists and pray-ers 
are praying together, even when little or no direct embodied interaction takes place. 
Furthermore, as in (2), in corporate prayer, there are many nested situations—we might only be 
directly aware of the individual reading the prayers, but there is a sense in which the situation is 
shared with those one came along to church with, the congregation who are present within the 
spatial confines of the church, and perhaps even those who are not physically present, but who 
are praying at home (we consider this case in more detail shortly). By adopting the theoretical 
notion of shared situations, we have a means of understanding the multi-scaled nature of shared 
experiences. For example, the case in [d] of Tongsung Kido involves only a minimal level of 
togetherness (generated by the shared situation of prayer) but is otherwise highly individualistic. 
In contrast, the liturgical practice shown in [c] strongly emphasises the corporate nature of the 
activity, both in the practice of responsive reciting of scripture and the physical arrangement of 
the activity with the brothers facing each other.  
 
2.3 Shared Situations and the Community of Prayer 
The sense of sharedness that arises from praying as part of a larger church community also 
appears to have applications when we consider the wider theological picture. As the 20th Century 
Anglo-Catholic theologian Evelyn Underhill describes in some detail, our private prayer and 
worship should be seen as united by the work of the Holy Spirit into the larger communion of 
saints (1936, 80-86), whether we are aware of this or not. If this is right, then, metaphysically 
speaking, prayer is never a ‘solitary undertaking’ (Underhill, 1936, 81), but rather it always plays a 
role in the wider community of the Church. There is not space here to unpick the metaphysical 
implications of this important theological position, nor to analyse this particular theological 
claim. However, as we will argue in this section, having the belief that one’s prayer plays a role in 
a wider whole can allow for a phenomenology of sharedness that can exist both in cases of 
physically co-present prayer, but even in cases where one prays alone. 
Let us consider two further examples to see how far this account might be extended:  
 
[f] ‘Sacred places and churches have an aroma of prayer; it’s almost as if the prayers and 
holiness of countless faithful over generations are clinging to the walls and columns.’ 
(Flanagan, n.d.) 
 
[g] Both on its visible and invisible side…[Christian worship] has a thoroughly social and 
organic character. The worshipper, however lonely in appearance, comes before God as 
a member of a great family; part of the Communion of Saints, living and dead. His own 
small effort of adoration is offered “in and for all”. … he shares the great life and action 
of the Church… He is immersed in that life, nourished by its traditions, taught, humbled, 
and upheld by its saints.’ (Underhill, 1936, 81) 
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Both of these examples invoke some concept of sharedness, despite the fact that there is no direct, 
embodied second-person engagement between the pray-ers. Whilst there is clearly a metaphysical 
dimension to this sharedness, we can also think phenomenologically about these cases. In the 
first case, the pray-er prays together with those who have prayed in the same building in the past 
(there is a temporal distance). In the second case, the pray-er prays alongside those who are part 
of the Church as a corporate whole (there is potentially a temporal-spatial distance, along with a 
dimensional distance; where and when the angels and saints in glory are praying is certainly 
beyond the scope of this discussion).  
Can the shared situation account provide some explanation of what is shared in cases in 
which there is no direct second-personal engagement? All of the cases involve some kind of 
phenomenological sharedness—that is, in all three cases the experience that one is not praying 
alone is taken to play some role in shaping the phenomenology of how one prays. This 
phenomenology seems to be (at least partially) grounded in the belief that others are praying 
alongside the individual (Shteynberg, 2015). As we have suggested above, whilst the sharedness 
of a situation ordinarily involves at least some interactive embodied engagement with others, 
there appear to be cases (such as the football match in (3), as well as the 1940 National Day of 
Prayer) in which sharedness is grounded purely in a belief about others, rather than in direct 
engagement with them.  
It is important to clarify this point further. We have so far considered various conceptual 
components of sharing attention. One is that it requires the motivation to share experiences and 
attention with others (Tomasello et al, 2005). Another is that it is, in many cases, an activity or 
action (Kidwell & Zimmermann, 2007), something that is enacted with others in embodied, 
second personal interactions. The third, and most pertinent here, is that it involves the joint 
attention state, in which one believes oneself to be sharing an experience with others (Shteynberg, 
2015). Early in development, this arises primarily (arguably, exclusively) through second personal 
engagement. But adults simply need the appropriate beliefs to achieve this state. For example, 
Risko and Kingstone (2011) found that participants (being watched by a hidden camera) avoided 
looking at potentially embarrassing stimulus (a swimsuit calendar on the wall) when they believed 
what they saw was in joint attention (wearing a functioning eye-tracking headset versus wearing a 
broken headset). It is reasonable therefore to claim that for a phenomenological experience of 
sharedness, holding certain beliefs suffices. 
This seems to account for what it is that makes examples [e], [f] and [g] instances of 
corporate prayer. These beliefs can be generated, as in [f], by entering environments which have 
a particular significance to individuals or communities. It would seem reasonable to argue that 
the spatial setting is important for facilitating a sense of sharedness. Consider, for example, how 
the physical layout of a stadium emphasises a sense that the game of football being played is the 
common focus of attention. Similarly, reflecting on the theological truth that our prayers are part 
of a wider corporate body, as in [g], may achieve a phenomenological sense of sharednessIn 
summary, it is clear that the boundaries of what constitutes a shared situation are fairly blurry 
and there appears to be a scale which ranges from embodied, interactive joint attention 
experiences of prayer (such as cases [b], [c], and [d]), to cases in which there is some embodied, 
dyadic joint attention, but the sense of sharedness extends beyond the experience (such as in [e]) 
and to then cases which appear have no embodied, dyadic joint attention but which appear to 
still have a phenomenology of sharedness (such as [f] and [g]). Along this scale, the second-
person, interactive features, which generate closer forms of alignment, continue to play a role in 
generating a stronger sense of sharedness, whether that be through the synchronous movement 
of the crowd or the simultaneous speech of the congregation reading liturgy. So, while the joint 
attention state can come about via relevant contextual cues that trigger the appropriate beliefs, 




3. The Value of Corporate Prayer as a Shared Situation  
Let us return to our initial question about the potential value of corporate prayer, and the ways in 
which it is distinct from private prayer. As we outlined in the opening section, one potential 
value of corporate prayer is its ability to engage us not only with God, but also with one another. 
This value, as Brümmer and Farmer have described it, is that corporate prayer allows us to be 
influenced by one another so that we might enlist one another into enacting God’s will in ways 
that private prayer often cannot. We are now in a clearer position to give a possible explanation 
for why this kind of influence occurs. 
 As we have suggested in the previous two sections, corporate prayer is an instance of a 
shared situation in which a sense of sharedness can be established by means of embodied, dyadic 
joint attention experiences, as well as by certain environments or scenarios that prompt us to 
form relevant beliefs relating to the sharedness of our situation. This can help us to think more 
carefully about the value of prayer as a shared situation.  
 Thinking of corporate prayer as an instance of a shared situation can help us to see how 
pray-ers might influence one another in the way described. For instance, one way of capturing 
the increase of effectiveness in certain kinds of prayer is in terms of what philosophers have 
called ‘common knowledge’ (Lewis, 1969). That is, there is a certain kind of knowledge that 
occurs in shared situations in which an individual knows not only some fact, but also that each 
other person with whom the situation is shared knows the fact, and that they each know that 
each other person knows that they know. As Michael Chwe (2001) describes it, common 
knowledge that occurs in shared situations allows us to get over so-called ‘coordination 
problems’, in which:  
 
…each person wants to participate in a joint action only if others participate also. One 
way to coordinate is simply to communicate a message, such as ‘Let's all participate.’ But 
because each person will participate only if others do, for the message to be successful, 
each person must not only know about it, each person must know that each other person 
knows about it. (2001, 8) 
 
Chwe thinks that common knowledge allows us to overcome coordination problems in a variety 
of shared situations. For instance, suppose a group are holidaying together and get separated in a 
busy street. Because each member of the group knows that the Ice Cream parlour is the agreed 
rendezvous point, as well as knowing that each of the other members knows this and that each 
member knows that each other member knows, the group are able to find one another when 
separated and thereby to overcome coordination problems. This kind of coordination can also 
occur in wider-scale groups, as Chwe points out. For example, Chwe notes, when the Apple 
Macintosh Computer was first introduced to the market, its products were incompatible with 
other computer devices and would only be able to share their data with fellow Macintosh users. 
This posed a kind of coordination problem— ‘a potential buyer would be more likely to buy if 
others bought them also’ (2001, 11). Apple overcame this coordination problem by presenting a 
short, stimulating commercial and screened it during the Super Bowl, one of the most watched 
television events of the year, thereby creating a kind of common knowledge about the 
Macintosh.  
Chwe’s discussion of common knowledge points to a helpful way of thinking about 
corporate prayer as a shared situation—certain goals or aims can become common knowledge 
between participants in a way that would be impossible with private prayer. As one referee 
helpfully highlights, this is pertinent to cases of what we could call ‘holy gossip’; prayers that 
make certain facts common knowledge which would otherwise be socially unacceptable to 
mention, such as ‘God please help David with his gambling problem’. Such examples highlight 
how prayer provides a unique context in which to share common knowledge within a 
community. They also bring out the complexity of the interaction between context and content; 
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such a prayer would carry a different significance if said between a married couple as opposed to 
in a church-wide prayer meeting. For our account, we would claim that the advantage of the 
shared situation approach is that it emphasises how the situation provides contextual framing 
which shapes the significance of what is prayed to those praying. This provides one motivating 
factor for engaging in activities that would otherwise be overly risky, whether that is purchasing a 
new computer that is incompatible with other brands (which was true of the Macintosh), or 
launching out to sea in a sailing boat to rescue stranded soldiers. Indeed, this seems to capture 
what goes on in many cases of prayer in which corporate prayer is supposedly more effective in 
enlisting others in the will of God. A part of what happens when individuals join together with a 
sense of sharedness is that some ideal becomes common knowledge between them, or at least 
that this common knowledge gets reinforced, making it more salient in their memories.23 Thus, 
as in example [e], when the congregant was spurred on to pray more fervently because she knew 
her community was praying alongside her, the sharedness of the situation no doubt proved 
invaluable in creating this common knowledge. Moreover, it seems plausible that this sense of 
sharedness plays an important role in overcoming coordination problems in religious 
communities more generally—the knowledge that I am not the only person who is aware of the 
needs in the community, or the world, surely plays an important role in overcoming the feeling 
that ‘I am just one person who cannot change the world’. What the sharedness of corporate 
prayer reiterates is that the values of a particular religious tradition, as well as certain duties or 
obligations, are common knowledge, thereby undermining the feeling of inadequacy against the 
daunting task of transforming the world. Psychological research has found that shared attention 
to a goal increases individuals’ motivation to complete that task, even with unseen others 
(Shteynberg and Galinsky, 2011; Walton, Cohen, Cwir and Spencer, 2012). 
The above observation seems to be true of cases which include embodied dyadic joint 
attention (such as [b], [c], and [d]) but also of cases in which all that exists is a belief in some kind 
of sharedness (such as [f] and [g]) which results from a particular environment or state of mind. 
The idea that one is not alone in, say, building the kingdom of God, or caring for the poor, or 
preaching the gospel, allows prayer to be more effective in overcoming problems of 
coordination. It also seems important that this kind of sharedness can be felt with those 
members of the Church who are temporally or spatially distant, or at the very least that the pray-
er may feel reassured that her labour is not in vain (1 Corinthians 15:58). As a referee points out 
to us—there are also many examples of prayer in Scripture in which corporate prayer is 
described as ineffective because God does not attend to their prayers. See Isaiah 1:15, for 
instance (note that the second person pronoun is plural):  
 
When you stretch out your hands, 
    I will hide my eyes from you; 
even though you make many prayers, 
    I will not listen; 
    your hands are full of blood. 
 
It is important to reiterate again that our claim is not that corporate prayer is always more 
effective, but that it has potential to be more effective. And so such examples are not counter-
examples to our argument, but rather, examples in which corporate prayer does not fulfil its 
potential. Indeed, since, as we have seen, group activities such as prayer provide opportunity to 
influence one another; one way corporate prayer might fail to fulfil its potential is in allowing us 
to exert the wrong kind of influence over one another. Yet, by appealing to an account of 
common knowledge, we have seen one way in which corporate prayer can be more effective in 
enlisting a group of individuals to enact the will of God; namely, by allowing them to overcome 
the coordination problems which come from the belief that one person can act effectively.  
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Another explanation for why praying together in a shared situation can be more effective 
than praying in private is that it allows for increased affiliation. In his book on coordinated 
movement, William McNeill describes how certain rituals such as dancing and military marching 
provide a kind of unity of feeling and consciousness between participants (1997, 7). Writing 
about the example of group dancing, McNeill describes a kind of ‘boundary loss’ occurring in 
which the individual feels they are one with the group because of a ‘blurring of self-awareness 
and the heightening of fellow-feeling with all who share in the dance’ (1997, 8).24 He argues that 
a similar phenomenon can be found in the use of military drills—acting together in unison with 
others can ‘create and sustain group cohesion; and the creation and maintenance of social 
groups’ (1997, 10). McNeill claims that acting together in dance and ritual fosters this sense of 
group cohesion, thereby achieving a kind of ‘practical efficiency’ (1997, 66) regarding the group’s 
aims and causes.  
Numerous studies in social psychology have vindicated McNeill’s arguments, showing 
that synchronous muscular coordination produces affiliation in both pairs and groups25. Similarly 
important is the role on imitation and mimicry. Following others such as Chartrand and van 
Baaren (2009), we use imitation to refer to intentional acts of imitating and mimicry to refer to 
spontaneous and non-conscious forms of imitation. Both forms have related but distinct effects. 
Research on imitation and mimicry has considered its role in understanding others as ‘like me’ 
(Meltzoff, 2005); both as thinking agents experiencing the world in a similar way and as those 
with whom I am (or can be) affiliated (Užgiris, 1981).26 Given the critical role of imitation in the 
development of understanding other minds and identifying with others, it is plausible that large-
scale activities involving imitation and mimicry support the process of aligning with others, 
increasing relational closeness and shared attitudes (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009). Corporate 
prayer, which frequently involves both intentionally imitating a leader’s or each others’ actions 
and words is therefore a context that is ideal for increasing affiliation between the community of 
pray-ers. 
Whilst not all corporate prayer includes muscular bonding and the kind of physicality of 
acting together which dance and military drill allow for (McNeill does discuss some instances of 
prayer that do in chapter 4), the sense of togetherness that shared situations can foster seems 
more generally applicable. Evidence from social psychology suggests that it is not just muscular 
coordination that can produce affiliation, but also sharing experiences in general. Research in 
social psychology has shown that sharing an experience boosts the emotional valence of that 
experience. Boothby and colleagues have demonstrated that sharing the experience of eating 
caused participants to enjoy the experience of eating chocolate more than eating it alone 
(Boothby, Clark and Bargh, 2014). This was felt even more strongly by friends who completed 
the task (Boothby, Smith, Clark and Bargh, 2016). Such effects are also found in cases of 
negatively valenced shared experiences. Bastian and colleagues (2014) found that strangers who 
experienced pain together felt closer than controls who experienced a non-painful shared 
experience, and were more cooperative when later asked to take part in an economic game.  
These findings suggest that sharing the experience of corporate prayer may both be an 
intrinsically unifying activity, but also something that increases the strength of emotions towards 
the target of attention (which may be a theological truth or a practical problem that needs to be 
overcome), thereby increasing the strength of shared belief and likelihood of action. This line of 
thinking fits with anthropological research on ritual, which has long emphasised the role of ritual 
in fostering close social bonds between participants. In recent years there has been an increased 
interest in the psychological effects of ritual (Fischer, Callander, Reddish & Bulbulbia, 2013; 
Norton and Gino, 2014; Wen, Herrman and Legare, 2016), and some attempts to integrate 
insight from anthropology with those from evolutionary psychology (e.g., Watson-Jones & 
Legare, 2016). However, we would want to exercise caution and avoid treating ‘ritual’ as a 
monolithic entity; cases of corporate prayer will have their own unique features and effects (and 
corporate prayer refers to a heterogeneous collection of practices).  
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As we have seen, one supposed value of corporate prayer is its ability to enlist more 
people around a certain goal or ideal and to make this goal common knowledge within a 
community. It appears that one further corollary of this phenomenon is that group ritual builds a 
sense of community in which the individual identifies as part of a group and feels more closely 
connected to those in the group. In the Christian tradition, emphasis is put on the fact that the 
togetherness of God’s people can be enlisted into the will of God, to bring about good. One 
benefit of praying together regularly is that this togetherness is emphasised, and the sense of 
sharedness is increased. Thus, we can see one further way in which corporate prayer might have 
potential to be more effective than private prayer in virtue of its shared nature.  
 
Conclusion 
We have been considering the nature and value of corporate prayer. As we have seen, whilst 
some theologians are keen to stress that corporate prayer and private prayer are importantly 
different, it is not always clear what this difference amounts to. We have offered an analysis of 
corporate prayer as a kind of shared situation. As we have suggested, this feeling of sharedness 
has a scale of intensity and can be caused in a variety of ways. Typically, embodied, interactive 
joint attention plays an important role in creating and maintaining shared situations, even if the 
sense of sharedness is temporally extended beyond the moments of interactive engagement. 
However, we have suggested that there might be other means of creating and maintaining the 
sense of sharedness that is vital to corporate prayer, by means of certain environmental or 
epistemic stimuli such as praying in a sacred space or with an awareness that the whole Church is 
joined together in prayer. Moreover, we have given two possible explanations for why corporate 
prayer might be more effective than private prayer in certain respects. First, because corporate 
prayer creates a shared situation, it also allows for a kind of common knowledge, thereby 
overcoming coordination problems and defeating the belief that ‘one person cannot change the 
world’. Second, because corporate prayer involves aligning with others on multiple scales, it 
fosters and encourages a sense of togetherness within a community which can thereby spur 
individuals on to engage in maintaining and pursuing certain ideals and goals.  
Finally, it is important to reflect on the limitations of what we have argued here. 
Throughout, we have not sought to give a full theological explanation of what corporate prayer 
does or aims to do, nor is our purpose to give a reductive explanation of how prayers are 
answered which excludes the need for theological explanations. Indeed, given that the New 
Testament seeks to emphasise that prayer involves the intercessions of the Holy Spirit (Romans 
8:26), alongside the prayers of the people of the Church, it is important to note that focusing 
only on the ways in which human pray-ers influence one another cannot fully account for what is 
going on in corporate prayer. Nor can it provide a comprehensive account of the value of such 
prayer. Rather, we have sought to engage in a constructive dialogue between theology, 
psychology and philosophy in order to enrich our understanding of why corporate prayer can 
prove to be valuable and effective. There are many more areas that the complementarian 
approach we have adopted here can help to think further about, which we hope to address at 
some point in the future. What is the role of the Communion of Saints in corporate prayer? 
What difference does our metaphysics of the whole Church make to our understanding of the 
psychology of liturgical practice? What explains the special role of sung prayers in a number of 
traditions? What role do collective intentions play in liturgical practice? How can a prayerful 
liturgical community grow together to the extent that even hearing another’s footsteps 
approaching a place of prayer become recognisable and important to the act of praying 
together?27 These are just some of the important theological questions which psychological 
research can help to explore in the future.  
 17 
References 
Akhtar, N. and Gernsbacher, M. A. 2008. ‘On privileging the role of gaze in infant social 
cognition.’ Child development perspectives 2(2), 59-65. 
 
Baesler, E.J. 1999. ‘A model of interpersonal Christian prayer.’ Journal of Communication & Religion 
22(1): 40-64. 
 
Baesler, E.J. and Ladd, K. 2009. ‘Exploring prayer contexts and health outcomes: From the chair 
to the pew.’ Journal of Communicaton & Religion 32(2): 347-374. 
 
Baesler, E.J., Lindvall, T. and Lauricella, S. 2011. ‘Assessing Predictions of Relational Prayer 
Theory: Media and Interpersonal Inputs, Public and Private Prayer Processes, and Spiritual 
Health.’ Southern Communication Journal 76(3): 191-209. 
 
Barwise, John. 1989. The Situation in Logic. Stanford: Centre for the Study of Language and 
Information.  
 
Bastian, B., Jetten, J. and Ferris, L.J. 2014. ‘Pain as social glue: Shared pain increases 
cooperation.’ Psychological science 25(11): 2079-2085. 
 
Benson, H., Dusek, J.A., Sherwood, J.B., Lam, P., Bethea, C.F., Carpenter, W., Levitsky, S., Hill, 
P.C., Clem, D.W., Jain, M.K. and Drumel, D. 2006. ‘Study of the Therapeutic Effects of 
Intercessory Prayer (STEP) in cardiac bypass patients: a multicenter randomized trial of 
uncertainty and certainty of receiving intercessory prayer.’ American heart journal 151(4): 934-942. 
 
Boothby, E.J., Clark, M.S. and Bargh, J.A. 2014. ‘Shared experiences are amplified.’ Psychological 
science 25(12): 2209-2216. 
 
Boothby, E.J., Smith, L.K., Clark, M.S. and Bargh, J.A. 2016. ‘Psychological distance moderates 
the amplification of shared experience.’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 42(10): 1431-1444. 
 
Botero, M. 2016. ‘Tactless scientists: Ignoring touch in the study of joint attention.’ Philosophical 
Psychology 29(8): 1200-1214. 
 
Bratman, Michael E. 2013. Shared agency: A planning theory of acting together. Oxford University Press. 
 
Brinck, I., Zahavi, D. and Reddy, V. 2017. ‘The Primacy of the ‘We’?’ In C. Durt, T. Fuchs and 
C. Tewes, Embodiment, Enaction and Culture. MIT Press: 131-147. 
 
Brown, Warren S. and Brad D. Strawn. 2012. The Physcial Nature of Christian Life. Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Brümmer, Vincent. 1984. What Are We Doing When We Pray?: A Philosophical Inquiry. London: 
SCM Press. 
 
Buttelmann, D., Zmyj, N., Daum, M. and Carpenter, M. 2013. ‘Selective imitation of in‐group 
over out‐group members in 14‐month‐old infants.’ Child Development 84(2): 422-428. 
 
 18 
Campbell, J. 2005. ‘Joint attention and common knowledge.’ In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. 
McCormack, and J. Roessler, Joint attention: Communication and other minds Oxford University Press: 
287-297. 
 
Carpenter, Malinda and Liebal, Kristen. 2011. ‘Joint attention, communication and knowing 
together in infancy.’ In A. Seemann, Joint attention: New developments in psychology, philosophy of mind 
and social neuroscience, MIT Press: 159-181. 
 
Chartrand, T.L. and Bargh, J.A. 1999. ‘The chameleon effect: the perception–behavior link and 
social interaction.’ Journal of personality and social psychology 76(6): 893-910. 
 
Chartrand, T.L. and van Baaren, R. 2009. ‘Human Mimicry.’ Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology 41: 219-274. 
 
Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. 2001. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. 
 
Chun, Yohang. 2017. ‘Tonsung Kido (A Unique Korean Prayer)’, The Upper New York Conference  
News, from: http://www.unyumc.org/news/article/tongsung-kido-a-unique-korean-prayer 
[accessed on 15/08/2018].  
 
Cockayne, Joshua, and David Efird. 2018. ‘Common Worship.’ Faith and Philosophy vol 35.3: 299-
325.  
 
Codrons, E., Bernardi, N.F., Vandoni, M. and Bernardi, L. 2014. ‘Spontaneous group 
synchronization of movements and respiratory rhythms.’ PLoS One 9(9): e107538. 
 
De Bruin, L., Van Elk, M., and Newen, A. 2012. ‘Reconceptualizing second-person interaction.’ 
Frontiers in human neuroscience, 6 (151): 1-10. 
 
Eilan, Naomi. manuscript. ‘Joint attention and the second person.’ Available at: 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/eilan/ [accessed on 17/08/2018]  
 
Fabian, Johannes. 2015. Talk about Prayer, An Ethnographic Commentary. Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Farmer, H. H. 1942. The World and God, New York: Harper 
 
Fischer, R., Callander, R., Reddish, P and Bulbulbia, J. 2013. ‘How Do Rituals Affect 
Cooperation?’ Human Nature 24(2) 115-125. 
 
Flanagan, Fr Eamon. N.d. ‘Prayer and Sacred Spaces’ from: 
https://www.stpetersphibsboro.ie/prayer-and-sacred-places/ [accessed on 15/08/2018] 
 
Gallagher, Shuan. 2011. ‘Interactive coordination in joint attention’ In A. Seemann, Joint attention: 
New developments in psychology, philosophy of mind, and social neuroscience. MIT Press.: 293-305. 
 
Gallotti, Mattia, Fairhurst, Merle T. and Frith, Chris D. 2017 ‘Alignment in social interactions.’ 
Consciousness and Cognition 48: 253-261. 
 
Giordan, Giuseppe. 2011. ‘Toward a Sociology of Prayer’ in Giordan G., Swatos, Jr. W. (eds.) 
Religion, Spiritiuality and Everyday Practice. Springer.  
 
 19 
Giordan, Giuseppe and Woodhead, Linda (eds.). 2015. A Sociology of Prayer. Routledge.  
 
Gómez, J. C. 1996. ‘Second person intentional relations and the evolution of social 
understanding.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19(1): 129-130. 
 
Gómez, J. C. 2005. ‘Joint attention and the notion of subject: Insights from apes, normal 
children, and children with autism.’ In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, and J. Roessler, Joint 
attention: communication and other minds: Issues in philosophy and psychology, Oxford University Press: 65-
84. 
 
Gregory, S. E., Jackson, A. and Margaret, C. 2017. ‘Joint attention enhances visual working 
memory.’ Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 43(2): 237-249. 
 
Hobson, R. Peter. 2005. ‘What puts the jointness into joint attention?’ In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. 
McCormack, and J. Roessler, Joint attention: communication and other minds: Issues in philosophy and 
psychology, Oxford University Press: 185-204. 
 
Hove, M.J. and Risen, J.L., 2009. ‘It's all in the timing: Interpersonal synchrony increases 
affiliation.’ Social Cognition 27(6): 949-960. 
 
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 2010 ‘The puzzle of petitionary prayer.’ 
European for the Philosophy of Religion, 2, no. 2: 43-68. 
  
Huebner, Bryce. 2013. ‘Socially embedded cognition.’ Cognitive systems research 25: 13-18. 
 
Humphrey, C. and Laidlaw, J. 1994. The archetypal actions of ritual: A theory of ritual illustrated by the 
Jain rite of worship. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Jeeves, Malcolm and Ludwig, Thomas. 2018. Psychological Science and Christian Faith: Insights and 
Enrichments from Constructive Dialogue, Templeton Press.  
Kidwell, M. and Zimmerman, D. H. 2007. ‘Joint attention as action.’ Journal of Pragmatics 39(3): 
592-611. 
 
Ladd, Kevin L. and Bernard Spilka. 2014. ‘Prayer and health research: proxies, missed targets, 
and opportunities.’ Revista Pistis Praxis 6(1): 33-50. 
 
Lakin, J.L., Jefferis, V.E., Cheng, C.M. and Chartrand, T.L., 2003. ‘The chameleon effect as 
social glue: Evidence for the evolutionary significance of nonconscious mimicry.’ Journal of 
nonverbal behavior 27(3): 145-162. 
 
Liebal, Kristin, Carpenter, Malinda and Tomasello, Michael. 2010. ‘Infants’ use of shared 
experience in declarative pointing.’ Infancy 15.5: 545-556. 
 
Luhrmann, Tanya M. 2012. When God talks back: Understanding the American evangelical relationship 
with God. Vintage. 
 
McNeill, William H. 1997. Keeping together in time. Harvard University Press. 
 
Meltzoff, A.N., 2005. ‘Imitation and other minds: The “like me” hypothesis.’ Perspectives on 
imitation: From neuroscience to social science 2: 55-77. 
 20 
 
Moore, C. and Barresi, J. 2017. ‘The role of second-person information in the development of 
social understanding.’ Frontiers in Psychology 8: 1-15. 
Moore, C., and Dunham, P. 1995. Joint attention: Its origins and role in development. Hillsdale: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Myers, D.G. 1999. ‘Is prayer clinically effective?’ Reformed Review 53(2): 93-102. 
 
Nielsen, M. and Blank, C. 2011. ‘Imitation in young children: When who gets copied is more 
important than what gets copied.’ Developmental psychology 47(4): 1050-1053. 
 
Norton, M.I. and Gino, F. 2014. ‘Rituals alleviate grieving for loved ones, lovers, and lotteries.’ 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 143(1): 266-272. 
  
Over, H. and Carpenter, M. 2012. ‘Putting the social into social learning: explaining both 
selectivity and fidelity in children's copying behavior.’ Journal of Comparative Psychology 126(2): 182-
192. 
 
Over, H. and Carpenter, M. 2013. ‘The social side of imitation.’ Child Development Perspectives 7(1): 
6-11. 
 
Quakers in Britain, ‘How Quakers Worship’, from: https://www.quaker.org.uk/about-
quakers/our-faith/how-quakers-worship [accessed on 15/08/2018]. 
 
Reddish, P., Fischer, R. and Bulbulia, J. 2013. ‘Let’s dance together: synchrony, shared 
intentionality and cooperation.’ PloS one 8(8): e71182. 
 
Reddy, V. 1996. ‘Omitting the second person in social understanding.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
19(1): 140-141. 
 
Reddy, V. 2008. How Infants Know Minds. Harvard University Press. 
 
Risko, E. and Kingstone, A. 2011. ‘Eyes wide shut: implied social presence, eye tracking and 
attention.’ Attention, Perception & Psychophysics 73(2): 291-296. 
 
Scaife, M. and Bruner, J. 1975. ‘The capacity for joint visual attention in the infant.’ Nature 
253(5489): 265-266. 
 
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., and Vogeley, K. 
2013.  ‘Toward a second-person neuroscience.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(4): 393-414. 
 
Searle, J.R. 1990. ‘Collective intentions and actions.’ Intentions in Communication, MIT Press: 401-
415. 
 
Searle, John. 2010. Making the social world: The structure of human civilization. Oxford University Press. 
 
Shteynberg, Garriy. 2015. ‘Shared attention.’ Perspectives on Psychological Science 10.5: 579-590. 
 
Shteynberg, Garriy. 2017. ‘A Collective Perspective: Shared Attention and the Mind.’ Current 
opinion in psychology 23: 93-97. 
 
 21 
Shyteynberg, G. and Apfelbaum, E.P. 2013. ‘The power of shared experience: simultaneous 
observation with similar others facilitates social learning.’ Social Psychological and Personality Science 
4(6): 738-744. 
Shteynberg, G. and Galinsky, A.D., 2011. ‘Implicit coordination: Sharing goals with similar 
others intensifies goal pursuit.’ Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 47(6): 1291-1294. 
 
Siposova, B., Carpenter, M. Forthcoming. ‘A New Look at Joint Attention and Common 
Knowledge.’ 
 
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. 1995. Relevance: Communication and cognition (2nd edition). Blackwell. 
 
Spilka, B. and K.L. Ladd. 2012. The Psychology of Prayer: A Scientific Approach. New York: Guildford 
Press.  
 
Stump, Eleonore. 1979. ‘Petitionary prayer.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 2: 81-91. 
 
Taylor, C. 1985. ‘Theories of Meaning.’ In C. Taylor, Philosophical papers: Volume 1, Human agency 
and language, Cambridge University Press: 248-292. 
 
Tollefsen, Deborah, and Dale, Rick. 2012. ‘Naturalizing joint action: A process-based approach.’ 
Philosophical Psychology 25.3: 385-407. 
 
Tomasello, M. 1995. ‘Joint Attention As Social Cognition.’ In C. Moore, and P. Dunham, Joint 
Attention: Its Origins and Role in Development . Hillsdale, New Jersery: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
1990: 103-130. 
 
Tomasello, Michael. 2013. A Natural History of Human Thinking. Harvard University Press. 
 
Tomasello, Michael; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Behne, Tanya and Moll, Henrike. 2005. ‘In 
search of the uniquely human.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(5), 721-727. 
 
Tribble, E. B. and Keene, N. 2011. Cognitive ecologies and the history of remembering: Religion, education 
and memory in early modern England. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Tuomela, Raimo. 2013. Social ontology: Collective intentionality and group agents. Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Ulanov, A.B. and B. Ulanov. 1982. Primary Speech: A Psychology of Prayer. Atlanta: John Knox Press.  
 
Underhill, Evelyn, Worship, 1936.  
 
Užgiris, I.C. 1981. ‘Two functions of imitation during infancy.’ International Journal of Behavioral 
Development 4(1): 1-12. 
 
von Zimmermann, Jorina, Staci Vicary, Matthias Sperling, Guido Orgs, and Daniel C. 
Richardson. 2018. ‘The choreography of group affiliation.’ Topics in cognitive science 10(1): 80-94. 
 
Walton, G.M., Cohen, G.L., Cwir, D. and Spencer, S.J. 2012. ‘Mere belonging: The power of 
social connections.’ Journal of personality and social psychology 102(3): 513-532. 
 
 22 
Watson-Jones, R.E. and Legare, C.H. 2016. ‘The Social Functions of Group Rituals.’ Current 
Directions in Psychological Science 25(1): 42-46. 
 
Watts, F. 2017. Psychology, Religion, and Spirituality: Concepts and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Wen, N.J., Herrmann, P.A. and Legare, C.H. 2016. ‘Ritual increases children’s affiliation with in-
group members.’ Evolution and Human Behavior 37(1): 54-60. 
 
Whitehouse, H. and Lansman, J. A. 2014. ‘The ties that bind us: Ritual, fusion and identification.’ 
Current Anthropology 55(6): 674-683. 
 
Zahavi, D. 2015. ‘You, me, and we: The sharing of emotional experiences.’ Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 22(1-2): 84-101. 
 
Zahavi, D. and Satne, G. 2015. ‘Varieties of Shared Intentionality.’ In J. Bell, A. Cuttrofello, and 





1 For literature in theology and philosophy of religion on prayer, see, for instance, Brümmer (1984), Stump (1978; 
1984) and Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder (2010). There have also been a number of psychological works on 
prayer. See, for instance, Spilka and Ladd (2012), Ulanov and Ulanov (1982) and Watts (2017). 
2 See, for instance, Giordan and Woodhead (eds., 2015), Giordan (2011).  
3 See, for instance, Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994), Whitehouse & Lanman, (2014). 
4 See, for instance, Fabian (2015).  
5 Note (as an anonymous referee points out to us) that Shteynberg’s concept of sharedness dovetails with some 
earlier work on the psychology of prayer. Spilka and Ladd talk about prayer providing a sense of connectedness 
between those one is praying alongside (2012, 44), which they suggest, can play an important role in the shaping of 
‘attitudes and values’ (2012, 44) within a community. 
6 For instance, see Myer’s (1999; see also his chapter in Jeeves and Ludwig (2018)) critiques of the methodology of 
the ‘Harvard Prayer Experiment’ (Benson et al., 2006). 
7 From a communications perspective Baesler and colleagues (Baesler, 1999; Baesler and Ladd, 2009; Baesler, Lindall 
and Lauricella, 2011) have also investigated the significance of different prayer contexts.  
8 This example aligns well with Spilka and Ladd’s account of the ‘inward’, ‘upward’, ‘outward’ model of prayer (2012, 
27, 47); prayer, on this model, involves seeking personal transformation (inward), being influenced by others 
(outward), as well as relating to God (upward).     
9 See also Ladd and Spilka (2014) on this point. With thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
10 See Searle (1990, 2010); Bratman (2013); and Tuomela (2013) for the key positions in the debate. 
11 See Akhtar and Gernsbacher (2008) and Botero (2016). 
12 For more detailed accounts that take a second-person perspective, see Gómez (1996; 2005), Moore and Barresi 
(2017), Reddy (1996; 2008) and Schilbach et al (2013). 
13 This notion of sharedness appears under different terms, such as a sense of something being ‘between us’ (Taylor, 
1985) or ‘mutually manifest’ (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). 
14 See Siposova and Carpenter (forthcoming). 
15 See de Bruin et al. (2012).  
16 See Gallotti et al (2017) and Tollefson and Dale (2012). 
17 A recent psychological discussion of corporate worship and psychology can be found in Brown and Strawn 
(2012).  
18 See Searle (1995) and Tomasello (1999). 
19 Campbell, 2005; Gallagher, 2011. 
20 Whitehouse and Lanman, 2014. 
21 Chwe, 2001. 
22 See Heubner (2013) and Tribble and Keene (2011) on this point.  
23 In support of this point, see Shteynberg (2015, 583) for a collection of evidence that sharing attention improves 
memory recall of the target of attention.  
24 Though see Zahavi and Satne (2015) on the importance of both individual autonomy and a sense of ‘We’ in 
collective activity. 
25 See Codrons, Bernardi, Vandoni and Bernardi (2014), Hove and Risen (2009), Reddish, Fischer and Bulbulia 
(2013) and von Zimmerman, Vicary, Sperling, Orgs and Richardson (2018) for evidence for the connection between 
affiliation and synchronised movement in pairs and groups. 
26 See Chartrand and Bargh (1999), Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng and Chartrand (2003) for discussion of social mimicry 
(‘The Chameleon Effect’) and its role in both creating affiliation between individuals and for indicating affiliation. 
See also Chartrand and van Baaren (2009) for a comprehensive review of the causes and effects of mimicry. For 
recent research on intentional imitation and its relation to affiliation and group membership dynamics, see 
Buttleman, Zymj, Daum and Carpenter (2013), Nielsen and Blank (2011) and Over and Carpenter (2012; 2013). 
27 With thanks to two anonymous referees for raising these important questions for future research.  
                                                 
